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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 782a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was there competent evidence to support the jury's verdict that the

defendant was negligent and that his negligence proximately caused the plaintiffs
injuries, and did the trial court therefore err in granting the defendant's motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.)?
Standard of Review
In passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v., "a trial court has no latitude and must be
correct." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). The trial court
can grant a j.n.o.v. only when the losing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted).
"Thus, the trial court may properly grant a motion for a j.n.o.v. only when the evidence
is, as a matter of law, insufficient to support the jury verdict." Id. (citation omitted). The
evidence is insufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law only if there was no
competent evidence to support the jury's verdict, viewing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
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party (here, the plaintiff). See id; Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997,
999 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). In determining whether there is competent evidence
to support the verdict, the court must "accept as true all testimony and reasonable
inferences flowing therefrom that tend to prove [the plaintiff's] case" and "disregard all
conflicts and evidence that tend to disprove [his] case." Gold Standard, 915 P.2d at
1066.
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the jury verdict was against the

manifest weight of the evidence and that the damages were excessive, and did it therefore
err in conditionally granting the defendant's motion for a new trial?
Standard of Review
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Braithwaite, 921 P.2d at 1001 (quoting Amoss v. Bennion, 517 P.2d
1008, 1010 (Utah 1973)). However, a trial court does not have discretion to grant a new
trial "if there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party and the judge
merely disagrees with the judgment of the jury." Crookston, 817P.2dat799n.9. See
also id. at 804.
The trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial aosent a snowmg of one of the
seven grounds listed in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). Braithwaite, 921 P.2d at
1001 (citation omitted). The trial court conditionally granted the defendant a new trial on
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two grounds-that the damages the jury awarded were excessive, under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(a)(5), and that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, under
rule 59(a)(6). (See Record ("R.") at 340-44, 400-01.) A trial court abuses its discretion
in granting a new trial if the court could not "reasonably conclude that the jury had acted
in a manner covered by the grounds stated in rule 59(a)(5) or (6)," that is, if it could not
reasonably conclude that the jury "acted with passion or prejudice" or that the jury's
verdict was "manifestly against the weight of the evidence." Crooks ton, 817 P.2d at 805,
804 (Utah 1991). For the trial court to order a new trial, the verdict must be "clearly
against the weight of the evidence," or there must be insufficient evidence to support the
verdict or the jury must have clearly acted with passion or prejudice. See id at 799 n.9,
804.
The appellate court must determine whether there was "'"substantial competent
evidence which would support a verdict for [the moving party],'"" Braithwaite, 921 P.2d
at 1001 (citations omitted), and reverse the grant of a new trial if there is "no reasonable
basis for the decision," Crookston, 817 P.2d at 805.

3

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50 governs motions for j.n.o.v. Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 59 governs motions for new trials. The text of these rules is set out in the
addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
This is an action to recover for personal injuries the plaintiff sustained when the

defendant ran into him while they were both skiing at Snowbird Ski Resort in Salt Lake
County, Utah.
The case was tried to a jury on March 11, 12 and 13, 1996. (R. 150-51, 209.)
After the parties rested, the defendant moved for dismissal. (R. 838.) The trial court
denied the motion and allowed the case to go to the jury. (R. 842.) The jury returned a
special verdict. It found that the defendant was negligent and that his negligence was a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. It found that the plaintiff was also negligent
but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of his injuries. The jury awarded the
plaintiff $16,458.84 for past medical expenses, $12,579 for past lost income and
$100,000 for lost future income or loss of earning capacity, for a total award of
$129,037.84. (R. 244-46.) A judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against
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the defendant for $134,769.04, which included $5,731.20 in prejudgment interest. (R.
270-72.)
The defendant filed a motion for j.n.o.v. or alternatively for a new trial or for
remittitur, on the groimds that (1) the jury's finding that the defendant was negligent was
contrary to the evidence and against the law; (2) the jury's finding that the plaintiff's
negligence was not a proximate cause of his injuries was contrary to the evidence and
against the law; (3) the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony regarding the
skier's responsibility code; and (4) the award of $12,579 for past lost wages was against
the law because it was based on lost gross income, not net income. {See R. 273-87.)
At the hearing on the defendant's motion, the trial court rejected the defendant's
arguments based on the exclusion of expert testimony and the alleged inconsistency in the
jury's finding that the plaintiff was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate
cause of his injuries. {See R. 340-42.) However, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for j.n.o.v. The court stated:
I felt, at the time the jury brought the verdict back, that they were dead
wrong. I felt, during the course of the trial, that there was no cause of
action.
.. . I'm still of the same opinion-even persuaded more—that there
was no duty owed to the plaintiff. And—well, maybe I should correct that:
there was a duty not to be negligent. But there was no negligence on the
part of the defendant in this case, and negligence, if any, was on the part of
the [plaintiff] and his failure to ski under control in consistency with the
skier's code.
5

.. . [T]he plaintiff failed to adhere to the skier's code. As I say, it
was negligence on his part, and the court is of the opinion that the jury was
wrong, dead wrong, or I would not be taking the position I am.
(R. 342-43.) The court further stated that it did not think there was even "an inference of
negligence . . . on the part of the defendant." (R. 344.) The court concluded:
My first inclination was to grant a new trial, but if the same evidence
came up, and the same verdict came in, and the same motion was filed
again, I would set it aside. Therefore, I feel compelled, and I do so, to grant
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(R. 343.)
The defendant submitted a proposed order granting his motion for a j.n.o.v. and
conditionally granting his motion for a new trial, and the plaintiff objected to the
proposed order. (See R. 346-47, 350-51, 363-69.) Following a hearing on the plaintiffs
objections (R. 957-80), the court signed the defendant's proposed order but struck the
paragraph conditionally granting a new trial (see R. 379, 383-85). The court later called
counsel and indicated that it was amending its prior ruling to conditionally grant the
defendant's motion for a new trial. (See R. 396-97.) Following another hearing (R. 98296), the court denied the plaintiffs objection to the proposed modification and entered an
amended order nunc pro tunc conditionally granting the defendant's motion for a new
trial (see R. 403, 399-401).
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The plaintiff has appealed the trial court's order granting the defendant a j.n.o.v.
and conditionally granting the defendant's motion for a new trial (R. 392), and the
defendant has filed a cross-appeal (R. 404-05).

B.

Statement of Facts
The plaintiff, Gary Ricci, is a self-employed shellfisherman from Rhode Island.

(R. 542.) He and his wife came to Utah in 1986 to go skiing. They loved the skiing so
much that they now own a home in Utah and spend their winters here skiing. Mr. Ricci
considers himself "a highly advanced, expert skier." (R. 552-53.)
On April 12, 1994, Mr. Ricci was skiing on a run known as Silver Fox or
Anderson's Hill at Snowbird Ski Resort. (R. 556.) It was a beautiful spring morning.
The sky was blue; the snow had been "catted" or groomed and was hard and smooth. (R.
564-65.) Mr. Ricci was skiing on the left side of the groomed area. (R. 570.) The
defendant, Dr. Schoultz, was skiing with several other skiers in front of Mr. Ricci in the
middle of the groomed area. (R. 570.) Anderson's Hill slopes down and then flattens out
into a "runout." (See R. 569.) There is a slight rise near the end of the runout. (R. 58182.) As skiers reach the runout, they customarily straighten out their path to maintain
their speed and make it over the flat part. (R. 580-81.) Mr. Ricci was traveling about
twenty miles per hour when he reached the runout. (R. 586.) Dr. Schoultz was traveling
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at about the same speed and was about twenty feet in front of and ten feet to the right of
Mr. Ricci. (R. 587.) The skiers9 rate of speed dropped off a couple of miles an hour as
they went through the flat portion. (R. 677.)
Dr. Schoultz had not had any trouble up to that point. (R. 588.) Suddenly, Dr.
Schoultz lost control of his skis, started to fall and veered to the left, directly into Mr.
Ricci's path. (R. 589-91, 605, 667-69.) Mr. Ricci swerved to the left to try to avoid Dr.
Schoultz, but Dr. Schoultz hit Mr. Ricci on his right leg and forced him into a tree off the
edge of the trail. (R. 592-93, 781-82.) The accident happened so fast that Mr. Ricci
could not have avoided it. (R. 592-94, 606.)
A ski patrolman who skied onto the scene shortly after the accident found Mr.
Ricci lying in the well of the tree to the left of the run and Dr. Schoultz standing to the
right of Mr. Ricci. (R. 775.)
Dr. Schoultz is an advanced skier. He was capable of skiing the most difficult
runs at Snowbird. (R. 821.) The area where the accident occurred is one of the easiest
portions of the mountain. (R. 564-65, 817, 827.)
At trial, Dr. Schoultz gave a different version of the accident. According to Dr.
Schoultz, he did not lose control or begin to fall. (See R. 809-10.) He was skiing under
control when Mr. Ricci struck himfrombehind on his right side, without any warning.
(See R. 698-700, 806.) Dr. Schoultz claimed that a photograph taken of bruises on his
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right side showed his version of the accident was correct. However, Dr. Schoultz failed
to have any photographs taken of his left side, and his medical records showed that he
was badly bruised on his left side as well, which was consistent with Mr. Ricci's version
of the accident. {See R. 689-98, ex. P-18.)1
Evidence was introduced of the skier's responsibility code, which provides in
relevant part that a skier is to "[s]ki under control and in such a manner that you can stop
or avoid other skiers or objects" and that, "[w]hen skiing downhill or overtaking another
skier, you must avoid the skier below you." (Ex. P-12; see also R. 602, 606.)
As a result of the collision, Mr. Ricci suffered five broken ribs, fractured his pelvis
in two places, suffered fractures in his cervical vertebrae and lower back and suffered a
collapsed lung and a tear in his spleen. (R. 610-13.) At the time of trial-almost two

1

This was just one of many inconsistencies in Dr. Schoultz's testimony. He
testified in his deposition that he was moving exactly straight ahead at the time of the
collision and was not making any turns {see R. 700), whereas in the incident report he
signed the day of the accident Dr. Schoultz said he was making small turns in the runout
(R. 702; ex. P-20). In his deposition, Dr. Schoultz testified that he was going no more
than five miles an hour at the time of the accident (R. 700), yet in his statement given the
day of the accident, he claimed he was going ten to fifteen miles an hour when he and
Mr. Ricci hit the tree {see R. 703; ex. P-20). In his deposition, Dr. Schoultz testified that
he and Mr. Ricci ended up in two separate trees, yet in the incident report he said they
both hit a single tree. (R. 703; ex. P-20. See also R. 837.) In his deposition, Dr.
Schoultz testified that he hit an elm tree, whereas in fact he hit an evergreen. {See R.
705-06.) The day after the accident, Dr. Schoultz told his doctor that the accident
occurred near a ski lift, yet at trial he admitted there was no ski lift anywhere near the
accident. (R. 704.)
9

years after the accident-Mr. Ricci still had a lot of back pain, which made it difficult for
him to work a full day. (R. 616-20.)
Mr. Ricci has not been able to earn as much since the accident as he did before the
accident because his income depends on the number of shellfish he is able to harvest, and
he is no longer able to work as many hours or as efficiently as he did before the accident.
(R. 621-25.) Before the accident, Mr. Ricci would fish about nine to ten hours a day.
After the accident, Mr. Ricci has only been able to fish about five to six hours a day. (R.
619.) Mr. Ricci introduced direct evidence of his gross revenues—the receipts for the fish
he harvested before and after the accident. (See R. 623-25, 633-37.) Mr. Ricci also
testified that his expenses remain essentially constant, regardless of whether he works
five or six hours a day (as he could after the accident) as opposed to eight or ten hours a
day (as he did before the accident). (R. 638-45.) The only expenses that are affected by
the number of hours he works per day are fuel, which varies roughly according to the
time he spends on the water, and wear and tear on his equipment; however, those
expenses would not change drastically. (R. 641-45.) Gary Couillard, Mr. Ricci's expert
on his economic losses, subtracted the expenses Mr. Ricci saved by not fishing as many
hours each day to arrive at his net income loss. (See R. 747-52, 755.) According to Mr.
Couillard, Mr. Ricci suffered a loss of $9,726 a year because of the accident. (R. 739.)
Discounting this figure over time, Mr. Couillard testified that Mr. Ricci's average yearly
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loss over his expected work life would be $6,991. (R. 740.) Mr. Couillard calculated
Mr. Ricci's lost future income resulting from the accident as $199,994. (R. 752-53.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a j.n.o.v. There was
ample evidence to support the jury's verdict that the defendant was negligent and that his
negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintifFs injuries. Therefore, the defendant was
not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Point I.)
The trial court also erred in conditionally granting the defendant's motion for a
new trial. The jury's verdict was not clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Instead, the trial court simply disagreed with the jury's verdict. That is not a sufficient
reason for granting a new trial. Moreover, there was no evidence that the jury's damage
award was given under the influence of passion or prejudice or that it was clearly
excessive under any rational view of the evidence. In fact, the jury award was less than
two-thirds of the amount the only evidence supported. (Point II.)
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ARGUMENT
L
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
In ruling on a motion for a j.n.o.v., the trial court has no latitude but must be
correct. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996). The
trial court could only grant the motion if Dr. Schoultz was entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. Id That would only be the case if there was no competent evidence to
support the jury's verdict, viewing all the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Ricci. See id.
Here, there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict that Dr. Schoultz was
negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of Mr. Ricci's injuries.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Ricci, the evidence showed that Dr.
Schoultz was an advanced skier who was capable of skiing the most difficult runs at
Snowbird. (R. 821.) The accident occurred on the easiest portion of the mountain, on
flat terrain and on "catted" or groomed snow. (See R. 817, 827, 564-65.) The day was
clear; the weather was good; there were no irregularities in the snow surface; traffic on
the run was light; and there was nothing in Dr. Schoultz's path to obstruct him or cause
him to lose control. (R. 564-65, 604, 801, 829-30.) Mr. Ricci testified that, in his
experience, if he were skiing on the flat area on groomed snow, he would not have lost
12

control of his skis if he had been paying attention to his skiing. (R. 678.) The jury could
reasonably conclude that Dr. Schoultz lost control of his skis because he was not paying
attention to what he was doing, that is, because he was negligent. There was no other
explanation for why Dr. Schoultz lost control when he did. (See R. 605.)
The evidence also showed that, when Dr. Schoultz lost control of his skis, he
veered left and fell into Mr. Ricci. (See R. 605, 668-69.) Mr. Ricci testified that Dr.
Schoultz9s loss of control was the cause of the collision. (R. 605.)
Thus, there was competent evidence from which the jury could conclude that Dr.
Schoultz was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
The order granting a j.n.o.v. (prepared by the defendant) recites that the court
found that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. (See R. 384, 400, f 1.) The
defendant never argued before moving for a j.n.o.v. that he did not owe Mr. Ricci a duty.
In fact, the defendant requested (R. 489) and the court gave the jury an instruction stating
that a person "has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other people or
property." (R. 224.) At the hearing on the defendant's motion, the court acknowledged
that Dr. Schoultz owed the plaintiff a duty not to be negligent (see R. 342), although the
court later backtracked from that statement (see R. 960-61).
The question of duty is one of law for the court to decide. See, e.g., Hunsaker v.
State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993). Absent a statute limiting the duty one skier owes to
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another, a skier owes a duty to other skiers on the slope not to endanger them through the
skier's own negligence. See, e.g., Novak v. Virene, 586 N.E.2d 578, 580 (111. App. Ct.
1991), and cases cited therein, appeal denied, 591 N.E.2d 24 (111. 1992). Cf. Clover v.
Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040-43 (Utah 1991).2
The skier's responsibility code, which the court cited in its oral ruling, recognizes
that every skier has a duty to ski under control and in such a manner as to avoid other
skiers. (See ex. P-12; R. 602.) Dr. Schoultz requested and the trial court gave the jury
instructions to the effect that the parties owed each other a duty to use reasonable care to
avoid injuring other people. (See R. 189, 224.) It was for the jury to decide whether or
not Dr. Schoultz breached that duty, and it concluded that he did.
The order granting the j.n.o.v. further states, "The evidence also established that
the plaintiff was the uphill/overtaking skier and that the accident occurred while plaintiff
was overtaking the defendant." (R. 384, 400 ^ 1.) The significance of this finding is not
explained. Presumably, the court was alluding to the skier's responsibility code, which
provides that, when "skiing downhill or overtaking another skier, you must avoid the
skier below you." (See R. 606.)

2

The court in Clover held that a ski resort could be vicariously liable where its
employee collided with and injured another skier while skiing to his workplace. The plaintiff in
that case had settled her claim against the employee, so the only issue was the employer's liability.
Obviously, if the employee skier owed no duty to the plaintiff, then the employee could not be
liable to the plaintiff, and his employer could not be vicariously liable. Thus, Clover supports the
proposition that one skier owes other skiers a duty to use reasonable care in skiing.
14

The evidence showed that, where the accident occurred, the ground was rising
slightly. (See R. 581-82, 668.) Mr. Ricci testified that he was not skiing downhill at the
time of the accident. (R. 606.) Thus, the jury could have found that Mr. Ricci was not an
"uphill" skier at the time of the accident. Mr. Ricci also testified that he did not intend to
overtake Dr. Schoultz. (R. 606.) At the time of the collision, the two skiers were
traveling at almost the same speed. (R. 586-87.)
Even if the court could properly find that Mr. Ricci was the uphill or overtaking
skier and violated the skier's responsibility code, that would not justify a verdict in Dr.
Schoultz9s favor. The skier's responsibility code does not establish the standard of care
but is just some evidence of what is reasonable care under the circumstances.3 See, e.g.,
LaVine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730, 733 (10th Cir. 1977). Cf. Yampa
Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Telecky, 862 P.2d 252, 257 (Colo. 1993) (evidence of compliance

3

Indeed, the court so instructed the jury:

In determining whether plaintiff and defendant used reasonable care at the
time and place of the incident involved in this case, you may consider the
provisions of the Skier's Responsibility Code as evidence of the care an ordinary,
prudent person would use under the circumstances. However, the Skier's
Responsibility Code is not a statute or ordinance and you are obligated only to
consider it and other evidence received on the question in deciding whether a party
did, or did not, exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.
(R. 232.) Dr. Schoultz requested this instruction as an alternative to his proposed instruction
number 9, which stated, "A skier has the duty to use reasonable care at all times to avoid placing
others in danger," and then set out the specific duties recognized in the skier responsibility code.
(SeeR. 194-95.)
15

with industry standards is not conclusive on the issue of due care but only one factor to
be considered); Runkle v. Burlington K, 613 P.2d 982, 993 (Mont. 1980) (unless they
have been adopted by a governmental agency so as to have the force of law, codes or
standards are not conclusive of the standard of care); Hansen v. Abrasive Eng'g&Mfg.,
Inc., 856 P.2d 625, 629-30 (Or. 1993) (evidence of non-binding rules may be considered
as relevant evidence of negligence, similar to evidence of industry custom); Wheeler v.
Jones, 19 Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 985, 987 (1967) (it was not error to admit evidence of
F.H. A. specifications where the trial court did not instruct the jury that the specifications
were the standard of the community); Prine v. Thelen, 496 P.2d 905, 907 (Wyo. 1972)
(evidence of custom in an industry does not fix the standard of care). A fortiori, the
skier's responsibility code does not impose strict liability on a skier. Mr. Ricci testified
that he did everything he felt was humanly possible to try to avoid Dr. Schoultz. (R.
606.) He did his best to avoid Dr. Schoultz and in fact spared him severe injury, but there
was not time for Mr. Ricci to stop before Dr. Schoultz veered into him. (R. 673.) The
jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that, even if Mr. Ricci was overtaking
Dr. Schoultz at the time of the accident and did not "avoid" him, Mr. Ricci was not
negligent or that his negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident.
In any event, afindingthat Mr. Ricci was "the uphill/overtaking skier" at the time
of the accident would at most only provide some basis for finding that Mr. Ricci was
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negligent. It would not excuse Dr. Schoultz's own negligence. The jury found that Mr.
Ricci was negligent but also found that his negligence was not a proximate cause of his
injuries. The trial court determined that the jury's latter finding was not improper. (See
R. 342 ("it was not an inconsistency such that anything had to be done on it, or that the
jury made any mistake on").) Thus, the court's finding that "the plaintiff was the
uphill/overtaking skier and that the accident occurred while plaintiff was overtaking the
defendant" does not justify a verdict in favor of the defendant as a matter of law.
In short, under the facts of this case Dr. Schoultz was not entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. It was therefore error for the trial court to grant his motion for j.n.o.v.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Dr. Schoultz moved for a new trial under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5),
(6) and (7), on the grounds that (1) the jury awarded excessive damages, given under the
influence of passion or prejudice, (2) there was insufficient evidence to justify the jury's
verdict or it was contrary to law, and (3) the verdict resulted from an error in law. (R.
273-74.)
In granting a motion for a new trial, the trial court is required to state the reasons
for its decision. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991). The
17

reason for this is to allow the appellate court to determine whether the trial court
impermissibly invaded the province of the jury:
In order to eliminate speculation as to the basis of the exercise of
judicial discretion in granting new trials, the record should show the
reasons and make it clear the court is not invading the province of the jury.
The trial court should indicate wherein there was a plain disregard by the
jury of the instructions of the court or the evidence or what constituted bias
or prejudice on the part of the jury. If no reasons need be given the
province of the jury may be invaded at will.... The exercise of judicial
discretion must be based upon some facts notwithstanding great latitude is
accorded the trial court in such matter.
Id. (quoting Saltas v. Affleck 99 Utah 381, 386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (1940) (citation
omitted)).
Although in announcing its decision to conditionally grant Dr. Schoultz's motion,
the court only mentioned the perceived insufficiency of the evidence {see R. 340-44), in
its order granting the motion the trial court stated two grounds-that the evidence was
insufficient, under rule 59(a)(6), and that the damages were excessive, under rule
59(a)(5). The trial court found no error of law justifying a new trial under rule 59(a)(7).
{SeeR. 400-01.)

A.

The Trial Erred in Granting a New Trial for Insufficiency of the Evidence.
The trial court's power to order a new trial is to be exercised only "in those rare

cases when a jury verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence," that is, where
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"the jury's verdict is so contrary to the manifest weight [of the evidence] that the trial
judge 'cannot in good conscience permit it to stand.'" Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d
530, 532 (Utah 1984) (quoting Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 441, 326 P.2d 722, 726
(1958) (concurring opinion of Crockett & Wade, JJ.)). Because of a litigant's right to
have a jury decide his case and the added expense and inconvenience of a new trial, "the
granting of la new trial on an evidentiary basis under Rule 59(a)(6) should be exercised
with forebearance [sic].'" Id. (quoting Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah
1982)). Although a trial court has discretion to grant a new trial where there is
"substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict for the [moving party],"
id (citations omitted), it is an abuse of the trial court's discretion to grant a party a new
trial merely because it disagrees with the jury's decision:
A trial court cannot grant a new trial if there is sufficient evidence to
support a verdict for either party and the judge merely disagrees with the
judgment of the jury. Mere disagreement is not a sufficient basis on which
to set aside a verdict and order a new trial. Rather, a trial judge may
properly grant a new trial... when he or she can reasonably conclude that
the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence or that there is
insufficient evidence to justify the verdict....
Croohston, 817 P.2d at 799 n.9 (citations omitted).
Here, the testimony of the only eyewitness to the accident—Mr. Ricci—supported
the jury's verdict that Dr. Schoultz was negligent. It showed that Dr. Schoultz lost
control of his skis for no apparent reason other than his own inattention and that his loss
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of control caused him to veer suddenly across the hill and crash into Mr. Ricci, forcing
him off the trail and into a tree. (See supra point I.)
The only contrary evidence was Dr. Schoultz's testimony. Dr. Schoultz testified
that he was skiing under control when he was suddenly struck from behind on his right
side by Mr. Ricci. (See R. 698-700, 806.) Although Dr. Schoultz had photographs of
bruises on his right back side, which at first glance tended to confirm his story, his
medical records showed that he sustained extensive bruising on his left side as well, and
he conveniently failed to have any photographs taken of his left side. (See R. 689-98.)
The jury was faced with two diametrically opposed versions of the accident—Mr.
Ricci9s and Dr. Schoultz's. The independent, physical evidence tended to support Mr.
Ricci's version of the accident. It showed that Dr. Schoultz had extensive bruises on his
left side-a fact Dr. Schoultz initially tried to hide-which was inconsistent with his claim
that Mr. Ricci ran into him from behind, on the right side. The independent evidence also
showed that both skiers ended up off the trail to the left of the run, with Mr. Ricci in a
tree well. This was also inconsistent with Dr. Schoultz's claim that Mr. Ricci had run
into him from behind while he was in the middle of the run. If that were the case, the
skiers would have ended up in the middle of the run. Their positions after the accident
were consistent, however, with Mr. Ricci's testimony that Dr. Schoultz veered across the
hill and forced Mr. Ricci off the run, to the left. The jury found Mr. Ricci's testimony
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more credible. The trial court disagreed. However, the mere fact that the trial court
thought the jury was "dead wrong" in its view of the evidence {see R. 342, 343) does not
justify the trial court in setting aside the verdict and ordering a new trial. See Crookston,
817 P.2d at 799 n.9, 804. It was for the jury to decide which witness to believe. The
more compelling evidence supported Mr. Ricci, and the jury verdict reflected this. The
trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial simply because it disagreed with
the jury's decision.4
The trial court also found that "the jury's conclusion that the plaintiff was
negligent, but not a proximate cause of his own injuries, was not supported by sufficient
competent evidence." (R. 400-01.)
In fact, there was ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that
any negligence on Mr. Ricci's part was not the proximate cause of his injuries. For
example, the evidence showed that Mr. Ricci did not verbally warn Dr. Schoultz of his
presence. (R. 667.) The jury could have reasonably concluded that Mr. Ricci was
negligent for not doing so but that a verbal warning would not have prevented the
4

In announcing its decision, the trial court stated that there was no
negligence on the part of the defendant and that any negligence was the plaintiffs, for
failing to ski under control as required by the skier responsibility code. (R. 342, 343.)
Under the skier's responsibility code, both skiers—Mr. Ricci and Dr. Schoultz—had a
responsibility to ski under control. {See R. 602.) Mr. Ricci testified that he was under
control and that Dr. Schoultz lost control. (R. 602, 605.) Dr. Schoultz denied that he lost
control before the collision. (R. 809-10.) The jury believed Mr. Ricci and not Dr.
Schoultz.
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accident, since the defendant lost control of his skis. The jury could also have concluded
that Mr. Ricci was negligent for not skiing closer to the edge of the catted area of the
runout (he was about five or six feet from the edge (see R. 570)), but that he would not
have avoided the accident even if he had been a few feet further over. Based on Mr.
Ricci's testimony that he could not have done anything to avoid the collision once Dr.
Schoultz unexpectedly lost control and veered into his path, there was ample evidence to
support the jury's conclusion that any negligence on the part of Mr. Ricci would not have
changed the outcome and was not a proximate cause of the accident.
In any event, Dr. Schoultz waived any alleged inconsistency between the jury's
finding of negligence and itsfindingof no proximate cause as a grounds for a new trial
when he failed to object to the verdict before the jury was discharged. See Bennion v.
LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985).

B.

The Trial Erred in Granting a New Trial for Excessive Damages.
The trial court also ruled that Dr. Schoultz was entitled to a new trial because the

damages were excessive under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5). (See R. 400.)
Under that rule, damages must not merely be excessive, but they must appear "to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5). To
justify a new trial for excessive damages under rule 59(a)(5), "the damage award must be
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more than generous; it must be clearly excessive on any rational view of the evidence."
Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1084.
There is no reasonable basis for the trial court's decision that the damages in this
case were excessive.
The jury's award of damages comprised three parts: $16,458.84 for past medical
expenses, $12,579 for past lost income and $100,000 for lost future income or loss of
earning capacity. (R. 245-46.) The plaintiff did not seek and the jury did not award any
general damages, that is, any amount for pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life.
(See R. 868, 245-46.) Dr. Schoultz stipulated to the amount of past medical expenses.
(R. 235, ex. P-24.) The only evidence at trial on the amount of lost income (past and
future) was the testimony of the plaintiff and his expert economist, Mr. Couillard. Dr.
Schoultz did not present any evidence of the plaintiffs lost income.
Mr. Couillard testified that Mr. Ricci lost $9,726 a year because of the accident.
(R. 739.) Thus, Mr. Ricci's losses for the nearly two years between the time of the
accident and the time of trial would have totaled over $18,000. The jury only awarded
about two-thirds of that amount.5

5

The jury's award was less than the evidence supported even if the jury had
calculated Mr. Ricci's past lost income using his average yearly lost income discounted
over the thirty-two more years he could be expected to work ($6,991) (see R. 740), rather
than his lost income for 1994 and 1995, the two years before trial.
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Similarly, Mr. Couillard testified (and the only evidence showed) that,
conservatively estimated, Mr. Ricci's lost future income resulting from the accident was
$199,994. (R. 752-53.) The jury awarded about half of this amount.
Where, as here, the jury's damage award was substantially less than the only
evidence justified, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the jury's award was
excessive or motivated by passion or prejudice, much less that it was "clearly excessive
on any rational view of the evidence." See Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1084. Cf. Caskey v.
Village ofWayland, 375 F.2d 1004, 1008 n.4 (2d Cir. 1967) (where a verdict is less than
the damages the plaintiff has incurred and proved by undisputed evidence, it is the
plaintiff—not the defendant-who is entitled to a new trial). The trial court therefore erred
in conditionally granting Dr. Schoultz a new trial for excessive damages.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a j.n.o.v. and
conditionally granting his motion for a new trial. The court should therefore reverse the
trial court's judgment and remand for entry of judgment in accordance with the jury's
verdict.
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ADDENDUM
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Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party,
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in
accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment,
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a
new trial shall be granted.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.

